- The Domain of Science Science -- "systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation" -- is the dominant force of the modern world. Philosophical and theological systems must give way against its force. Most people know this -- or should. Yet billions continue to hew to archaic beliefs, ones that should have long ago been abandoned. This essay reviews this and, specifically, that "truth" does come with a measure and is not arbitrary. That measure is the physical world, the "real" world.
- Philosophy's Remaining Range This essay discusses what value, if any, philosophy can have, laying aside specific conclusions as to "what is" and "how things work" as the domain of science. Philosophy is still necessary to address four broad questions: (1) epistemology (or what it means to "know" and how we know); (2) existentialism (what it means to exist); (3) theology (whether any meaningful religious or spiritual system exists and what the consequences of that are, if any); and (4) behavioral, social, and moral philosophy (or how to act). These subjects are so often thoughtlessly lumped together under the rubric "philosophy" -- and the answers to one or another just assumed -- that discussions of "philosophy" become so much nonsense. Yet some meaningful straight-up answers can be had if the right questions are asked, particularly in light of what we know from science.
- Logic and its Discontents This essay discusses the appropriate uses of logic as both a formal and informal method of analysis and inference. It also discusses when formal logic is not useful, reviews the reservations some have about logic, and, towards these ends, discusses the sources of logic and why logical method not only works in the "real" world but is a necessary predicate of it. No specific logical system is insisted here as superior (appropriateness of logical system depends, of course, on context); what can be said is that what is known about the world is not wholly inductive, though we must begin with induction.
- Feelings and Reason Following on Logic and its Discontents, above, this post discusses the conflict people often "feel" exists between their emotions and rationality. Emotions and rationality need not be at odds -- they can mutually inform -- but when they are at odds there are situations when each must give way. I grace the internet with my "profound" views on when.
- A Tree in the Forest This post takes on, in a lighthearted way, the old philosophical saw "if a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?" It's not a hard question; it just depends on what you mean by "sound." I discuss this and the misconceptions many have about what it means to "know" (see also The Scope of "Knowledge," below.).
- Words, Symbols, and Meaning I propose here only what is obvious and observational: spoken words arise from the effort to associate objects and ideas with sounds, enabling communication; that the association is learned by sharing sounds and associations; that complex associations (at least) are often (if not always) ambiguous but sufficiently definite to communicate; that this true as well for grammar; that written words and/or grammars are composed of symbols, logograms, or ideographs to represent the object or idea or relation and its associated sound(s); that spoken and written words and/or grammars do not have intrinsic meanings but only meanings provided by culture and use (this, BTW, makes no comment on Chomsky's views as they only speak to predilection); and that the meanings of words and symbols, as well as their representations, change over time due to ambiguity in expression and understanding and changes of circumstance. Words and their congeners, in other words, are not eternal mystical entities of certain unvarying meaning.
- Numbers and Formulas This essay discusses a common misconception many have about numbers, that they are "real" things that exist in the physical world (and external to humans) rather than constructs used for counting and analysis.It then addresses the slightly broader issue about formulas: these are not writ by nature but people; the purpose of a formula is to try to predict how nature will function. For clarity the essay starts with the basics about the difference between digits, numerical symbols, units and number values, then discusses the absence of a natural elementary unit, then discusses differences in number and counting systems and their history. I then discuss negatives and then imaginary numbers, which as many mathematicians have pointed out, are no more imaginary than "real" numbers. I then return to formulas, as above, and conclude in discussing their role in relation to science as theoretical constructs supported by observation and experiment.
- Boundary Problems While "things," whether they're concrete or conceptual, often seem to have well defined natural boundaries, as a matter of fact those boundaries are often (if not always) indistinct. This post discusses why physical boundaries are indistinct, reviewing the evidence in some detail from the atomic level on up. I then discuss when conceptual boundaries are inherently indistinct but can be made distinct by definitions. In short, identity is something we impose (albeit not without good reason). This issue is taken up further in the post Definitions and Existence, outlined below.
- The Use and Errors of Reification "Reification" is the treatment of a concept or abstraction as a concrete "real" thing. It is useful as a tool to simplify expression -- indeed, it is so embedded in English that it is unavoidable. (Consider the multiple reifications of "reification" in the last two sentences.) Serious problems arise, however, when the act of reification is forgotten, and it is assumed that a concept or abstraction actually exists or is bounded by the natural world rather than by definition or use. This essay reviews the problems with reification -- which are fundamental in philosophy -- in detail.
- The Scope of "Knowledge" All knowledge depends on either memory or observation. (By "memory" I include all forms of recall whether conscious, subconscious, or autonomic). There is no such think as absolute knowledge since both memory and observation are fallible. When one says they "know" their sense of absoluteness, if they have one, is illusory. Here we pause for a moment to discuss Descartes's cogito and then Kant's a priori. Interestingly, neither should entirely be abandoned (both require some reformation), yet neither, to the extent correct, leads to certain knowledge. Even the most fundamental axioms are either assumed or depend on observation. (N.B. for this reason I do not include reasoning as a source of knowledge itself; it is derivative. See also Premises, Logic, and Error, below.) That all is uncertain, however, does not require us to abandon hope in knowledge or to believe all is equally relative. We can have great confidence in memory and observation in many circumstances, just not absolute, never questionable confidence.
- Definitions and Existence This post, building primarily on the essays Boundary Problems, The Use and Errors of Reification, and The Scope of Knowledge, above, discusses the facts that (a) we have good evidence that a physical world exists outside of "us"; (b) the "things" that compose that physical world are not truly discrete but as discrete objects are defined implicitly or explicitly; (c) we can also define conceptual "things" but these lack a physical paradigm; (d) conceptual "things," lacking a physical paradigm, are not "real" in the sense of physical things; (e) we can analyze conceptual "things" as if they were real physical objects for the purpose of simplicity, but significant errors in understanding what actually exists when we have such hubris to think that our concepts are actually tangible objects; and (f) it's fine (indeed, very helpful), likewise, to speak of physical or conceptual things as discrete from others but when we ignore that we're the source of their definitions we run into serious (and unnecessary) philosophical dilemmas. None of this is to say that there are not good reasons for most of the boundaries/definitions we use (so good, generally, that we can do so implicitly and others usually know what we mean); nonetheless they are artificial -- imposed by the observer. "Nature" does not care about the identity or label of a thing. (N.B. an ancillary discussion reviews the incorrectness of the traditional analytical/synthetic distinction and how this squares with the main discussion; another discusses the differences between the observer and the observed as it relates to the discussion.)
- How We Know a Meaningful God Does Not Exist We know that "God" (or a system of god(s) or spirits, which is what I mean by "God") does not exist because there is overwhelming evidence against those beliefs and no evidence for them. Since this is such a sensitive subject for so many, though, I discuss it in more detail, reviewing, first, a number of the theological, logical, and factual problems with Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, folk Daoism, and Animism, and, second, I briefly discuss some of the more creative arguments for the existence of God. A common theme is that one can call anything "God," but if it is not meaningful (i.e. in response to prayer, belief, or act, the God will intercede on Earth or reward the follower after death), the belief is inane. At its core, the question whether God exists is a factual one; belief alone, no matter how heartfelt, cannot make God so.
- The Answers, Such as They Are In the post Philosophy's Remaining Range, above, I outlined four key issues left for philosophy outside of science. This post summarizes and systematizes the answers to the first three -- above as to (1) epistemology, see The Scope of Knowledge; as to (2) existentialism, see Definitions and Existence; and as to (3) theology, see How We Know a Meaningful God Does Not Exist. As to the fourth -- "(4) behavioral, social, and moral philosophy (or how to act)" -- there is no certain answer as to that. Instead, the choice of action depends wholly on the choice of goal, and there is no definitive goal. This is not to say that many philosophies and religions have not tried to advocate for certain goals as superior. Their arguments are often factually driven and wrong, but, regardless, they are always value driven and never definitive.
- Individual and Social Norms This post discusses the fact that different rules -- and different answers -- may apply whether one focuses on what is best/most appropriate for an individual or small group versus for society or a large group. Ignoring this leads, as philosophers of all stripes often do, to nonsense under the rubric of prescriptive or moral philosophy. Yet rectifying potentially different norms is a serious problem; simply trying to impose an answer to the question (as often happens when it's asked) is no answer at all. Nonetheless, I think we can know the boundaries/limits for meaningful even if lacking a definitive answer.
- Why Care? This is a discussion about whether there is a principled reason for people to care for others -- or to care about anything (even to care about being principled) -- in the absence of a social, moral, or theological command. The genesis of this is the belief by some that religious belief (specifically) or moral belief (generally) is necessary for people to act responsibly towards one other -- indeed, to be any way besides self-serving, manipulative, dishonest, and opportunistic. Religion and morality to the side, there are still not only pragmatic and emotional reasons to care but a principled one -- the reflexivity of the golden rule -- and that is true regardless of whether one is discussing individual or social norms (in general). The fact that there is a principled reason to care is no guarantee that either individuals or societies will care.
- Why I Wish There Was a God This essay -- a surprising one you if you've read my other thoughts -- discusses a certain sense of "God" (here, as best I can succinctly summarize, a timeless all-aware moral spirit that all people (perhaps all things) share in through their "souls") and why I wish it did exist and how we know it does not. This is my favorite essay and also my saddest.
- Premises, Logic, and Error A short discussion of the fact that that the potential error of any logical analysis is ≥ the potential error of any premise. While it's digressive, I also discuss the fact that implicit results from a logical framework should not formally be thought of as new knowledge (indeed, all such knowledge could be generated by a computer), and I distinguish what I call external observations (observations about the world) from internal observations (results purely from analysis) -- I may separately post on this because it's an interesting and complex subject (particularly when discussing external observations of internal observations).
- The Quasi Logical Nature of the Law This essay -- which focuses on U.S. law though its thesis applies to all "first world" legal systems -- discusses the fact that the law does not use formal logic but nonetheless has pretenses to logic. Those pretenses that are clumsily reflected in the primitive methods used by lawyers and judges to analyze legal issues. Yet lawyers and judges do not advocate or propound opinions in a more rigorous manner, even when they have the wherewithal, since doing so would be no more than the jabber of a foreign language beyond their audience's ken. The law, unfortunately, is currently hemmed in by its own archaic structures and their antecedents in Roman, feudal, ecclesiastical, Napoleonic, and "common" law and its history of causistic reasoning. What is interesting, however, is how logic reaches in, anyway, and is reflected in a sort of pseudo-analysis, particularly in the function and decisions of judges. I take this further in the essay noted, below, Ambiguity and the Role of Judges.
- Judge and Jury, Law and Evidence, Formula and Fact A precept of most common law systems is that, in a case, the role of the jury is to find the facts and the role of the court is to determine the law. Of course, many issues involve a mixture of law and fact, and teasing out which is which is often difficult. One might say that a fact is something about the world external to the courtroom and requires evidence. This essay discusses that the law is actually a system rules that function as formulas with the data for variables determined as the facts of the case leading to an outcome. I offer examples. Many examples. I conclude by discussing how this, in fact, differs markedly from a scientific or technological conclusion, for in a courtroom the finding of facts is far from scientific.
- Positive Law and Inference Building from my former post Positive Law and Natural Law, this essay discusses whether rules whose inference is required from express legal statements are fairly thought of as positive laws -- that is laws originating from people -- as opposed to natural laws -- that is laws originating from "Nature." They are positive laws because they only exist due to human expressions (i.e. legal statements and chosen rules of logic, of which there are multiple possibilities though some may be better than others). If the express legal statements are well formed within the chosen framework, then their inferences need not be explicitly stated to be understood as part of the positive law. This does not mean they are "real" in the same way physical objects are "real," of course. No positive law is "real" in that manner.
- Rights as Positive Law One of the shibboleth's of Western societies is that people have inherent rights. The Declaration of Independence states they do, as does Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man and France's The Declaration of the Rights of Man. Unfortunately, human history before these declarations -- and much since -- does not support that humans have natural rights. Indeed, our rights would not need declaration if they were natural rights. One of the fantastic things about each of these documents is that they do declare rights. As further reflected, for instance, in the Bill of Rights, these rights formally became law, enforceable in courts against the government, demanding not just of lip service but respect. They are positive laws, and we should be proud of this -- it is a great achievement -- and hopeful -- for these rights can be expanded and clarified. (Indeed, the U.S. Constitution does this in its later amendments, though that's often overlooked).
- The Law as a Liberal Institution The "law" is prototypically viewed as restricting freedom, as prohibiting and punishing conduct the state or its citizens view as undesirable. The reason it takes this role, of course, is, in theory, to aid and safeguard citizens and institutions. Yet we are justifiably skeptical as there are many examples of draconian laws. The thing is, I've noticed that most instances of governmental abuse in fact involve violations of the law. The law is not the problem; its enforcement (and policing those charged with its enforcement) is the problem. Of course, there are arbitrary and harsh laws, too, yet those are often ones imposed by a sovereign, dictator, or claque. Moreover, the law can be designed to protect rights (indeed, it is not usually designed to abuse rights even if it does not protect them -- abuse is done, typically, in the shadows even in corrupt institutions). This essay discusses the circumstances when the law may foster rights.
- Uncertain Meanings and the Role of Judges One of the consequences of the fact that words are not eternal things of certain unvarying meaning (see Words, Symbols, and Meaning, above) is that their meanings are often ambiguous. Laws in western societies are written with words, and this leads, as is well known, to uncertainty in the scope of the law. The role of judges is to resolve these uncertainties. There's nothing wrong with that, by the way; someone has to do it, and the people we've chosen are simply called "judges." Anyway, the task of a judge is not just to resolve the meaning of words like a sort of adjudicative dictionary but to determine the meaning of the law itself. That involves finding out, if the law is uncertain, what it is meant to say; in other words, what is wrong, what is missing, and what is extra. She is resolving the enthymemes, irrelevances, and ambiguities of prior statutory and interpretive law by making assumptions about how it should have been stated to reflect it's intended meaning. I discuss the details of this, how it squares with a representative system, and how it squares, as well, with the law as "pseudo-logical" statements.
- Due Process and Due Knowledge of the Law If one cannot know the law one cannot assure compliance with it. This post discusses the sovereign's obligation to make the law known or knowable before seeking compliance. It reviews individual (subjective) knowledge versus theoretical (objective) knowability, the obligation of citizens to inform themselves, the need for legal expressions to be accessible and comprehensible, and what happens when the law is ambiguous and a not widely unanticipated conclusion regarding meaning is reached.
- The Law as Logical System This essay (differing from The Quasi Logical Nature of the Law, above) discusses how a legal system could be constructed as a logical system, why that could be a good thing -- and it could be a very good thing -- and why that could also be a very bad thing. In this essay I also discuss the fears people have about logic as well as legalism (see also my prior essay The Law as a Liberal Institution), issues about comprehension of the law, and whether a more rigorously logical set of laws would better serve due process (see also my prior essay Due Process and Due Knowledge of the Law).
- Original and Objective Meanings in the Constitution, Statutes, Cases,and Contract Over the last 50 years an expansive debate has raged in the U.S. over the proper way(s) to interpret the law. The debate arises from conservative displeasure with some holdings of the Warren Court and attempts to justify those holdings as part of a "living constitution." There are older antecedents to the debate, of course, notably concerns over judicial "legislation" and how contracts should be read ("objectively" or "subjectively"). Within the debate are questions about whether interpretation must only come from the "four corners" of the document or evidence of intent is considered, whether the meaning of words change, how one determines the meaning of words, and what actually constitutes vagueness or ambiguity. This essay outlines the debate and discusses some basic linguistics. The bottom line is that textualism and original meaning does matter, but it often does not add up to what conservatives want.
- "He's a Cruel Man but Fair": the Scope of Equal Protection and Due Process This essay reviews U.S. due process and equal protection law, covering their sources and differences,and whether some minimum quanta of process is required before rights are infringed. The idea that there is such minimum requirements takes the name of "substantive due process." (N.B. The phrase "he's a cruel man but fair" is uttered by Monty Python character Stig O'Tracy regarding the somewhat minimal process povided by gangster Dim Dimsdale -- it seems to me to encapsulate the concept well.)
- The Social Adhesion Contract The "social contract," of course, is the ancient idea (most popularly attributed to Rousseau though existing long before him) that government and laws arise by implicit or explicit agreement among a populace. An "adhesion contract" is a contract that one party must accept without the chance to negotiate terms. Citizenship almost always arises by dint of birth, not choice; the laws that govern even in a democracy are mostly laws over which no living person had a choice. This essay discusses whether there are ways to increase citizen "ownership" of the law and commitment to it.
- Some Carefully Considered Thoughts on "Consciousness," the Brain, the "Mind," and their Function This speculative essay discusses "consciousness" as "awareness of (one's) thought." It is evident from numerous experiments and observations that our minds do a great amount of thinking of which we are never aware. those thoughts may be as reasoned as the ones of which we are aware. "Consciousness" is not independent reasoning, per se, but a sort of meta process where we become aware of some of our thoughts and direct them. This allows us to channel our thinking into lines we think are more productive, and dovetails with needs for human use of language, tools, image, and expression. It also dovetails with learning and memory (and behaviorism) if one recognizes that learning and memory result from repetition of use of neural pathways, which strengthens them, as well as pairing away unnecessary/unused pathways. "Consciousness" promotes this practice. This view is a sort of non blackbox view of behaviorism.
- The Design of "Conscious" Computers One way to test the theory proposed above in Some Carefully Considered Thoughts on "Consciousness," the Brain, the "Mind," and their Function is to attempt to build a computer that follows this process. This post discusses an overview of how that might be done and what needs to be added to make such a "conscious" computer autonomous and human like (were that desired).
- I, for One, Bow Down to Our Coming Computer Overlords (the Problem isn't Just Processing Speed, it's that Computers Don't Forget and Can Learn Seamlessly) I don't seriously think that computers are about to take over the world -- and, if and when they do, I expect to be either dead or have my brain incorporated into one (much to its detriment) -- nonetheless it is a little unnerving to think about what they might be able to do. More scary than what computers might do to us, though, are the questions about our ability to emotionally handle the growing capabilities of computers. That is a real world problem. I discuss it.
- Computers, Robots, and the Concentration of Wealth The mechanization/computerization of the production of goods and services makes production more uniform, faster, and cheaper. The trade-off is that it requires a substantial upfront investment which is paid off through the the efficiencies possibly better products and services, and lower costs during operation. "Workers," as such, do not necessarily benefit from robots and computers although their benefit (in theory) is to ease human burdens. Those who can make the substantial investment in them are those who profit. That may be good or bad (I'll leave the math there as an exercise for the reader), but it is what it is.
- Multiverse, Schmultiverse It is vogue right now to consider that multiple universes exist, an outgrowth of some interpretations of quantum mechanics, big bang theory, black holes, infinity(ies), modal realism .... Two questions should be asked: is there some test for multiple universes (is the notion falsifiable)? and does the claim there are multiple universes matter? I argue it doesn't matter until there's even theoretically a possible test.
- Infinite Misery This post discusses the use and misuse of the concept of infinity, a concept that is not only a frequent source of bad reasoning by laymen but also -- more than one might expect -- by mathematicians and philosophers. Infinity is a concept lacking even an observable model (unlike numbers as discussed in Numbers and formulas, above); it's a concept that is mathematically useful but can lead to silly mistakes when treated as a real "thing." There's a history of this (and I'll discuss the history), so much so that I only half in jest propose a new form of logical fallacy: reductio infinitum. When one can show an argument depends on unresolvable infinities, it's wrong. (NB: that's different than reductio ad infinitum which is an argument supposedly lacking a "first cause.")
- Quine's Dogmas This post discusses the similarities and differences between Quine's views (notably from his Two Dogma's of Empricism and Word and Object) and the informal views I express in the posts above.
- A Critique of Pure Kant Kant is the darling of misguided academics in philosophy departments. This post discusses a few of Kant's key conclusions. We have fun.
- The Legacy of Nietzsche's Will This lighthearted post tosses out quotes from Nietzsche, commenting on each. I may break it into several posts.Those anxious for something along these lines should go immediately to Nietzsche Family Circus.
Of course, these articles/essays/posts may never materialize in a final post, and they could be substantially revised. I've got a number of other essays in mind that I really haven't worked through, so I'll keep those to myself for now, thank you very much. Ah, well, to work.
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